Exhibit 8

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL

MINUTE ORDER

DATE: 09/30/2020

TIME: 12:50:00 PM

DEPT: C-67

JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Martin W. Staven

CLERK: Patricia Ashworth

REPORTER/ERM: Not Reported BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT:

CASE NO: 37-2020-00015679-CU-IC-CTL CASE INIT.DATE: 05/26/2020

CASE TITLE: BEST REST MOTEL INC VS SEQUOIA INSURANCE COMPANY [IMAGED]

CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited CASE TYPE: Insurance Coverage

APPEARANCES

The Court, having taken the above-entitled matter under submission on 09/25/2020 and having fully considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral, as well as the evidence presented, now rules as follows:

Plaintiff dismissed Amtrust North America, Inc. for insurance coverage on June 26, 2020, so Amtrust's demurrer is moot.

Defendant Sequoia Insurance Co.'s demurrer to the complaint of plaintiff Best Rest Motel, Inc., dba Holiday Inn Express Old Town complaint is overruled. There are questions outside the complaint whether there is insurance coverage under this policy as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Judicial notice is granted to defendant's exhibits 1-3, the various executive orders. The court grants judicial notice of exhibit 4, Department of Insurance "FAQ on business interruption insurance and other issues affecting California small businesses", and exhibits 5 and 6, the press releases, but not for the truth of the matters asserted therein.

Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of exhibits 1 and 2 are granted to the extent the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency, Public Health Services, Epidemiology and Immunization Services Branch; "County of San Diego – Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Interactive Data Set – Confirmed Cases by City" for the City of San Diego; (accessed September 14, 2020) published data, but not the for truth of the matters asserted.

Plaintiff's objections to the cases cited by defendant in the reply are overruled. There are sufficient facts alleged in the complaint to withstand a demurrer.

Defendant shall file and serve an answer by October 15, 2020.

DATE: 09/30/2020

DEPT: C-67

MINUTE ORDER

Page 1

Calendar No.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO Central 330 West Broadway San Diego, CA 92101 SHORT TITLE: BEST REST MOTEL INC VS SEQUOIA INSURANCE COMPANY [IMAGED] CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL CASE NUMBER: 37-2020-00015679-CU-IC-CTL

I certify that I am not a party to this cause. I certify that a true copy of the Minute Order 09/30/2020 was mailed following standard court practices in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed as indicated below. The mailing and this certification occurred at <u>San Diego</u>, California, on <u>09/30/2020</u>.

S. ash	worth	
Clerk of the Court, by:	P. Ashworth	Deput

SARA M THORPE NICOLAIDES FINK THORPE LLP 101 MONTGOMERY STREET # 2300 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94104

CHARLES S LIMANDRI 9120 RANCHO SANTA FE, CA 92067

Additional names and address attached.

Transcript

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO CENTRAL DIVISION DEPARTMENT C-67 BEFORE HON. EDDIE C. STURGEON, JUDGE BEST REST MOTEL, INC., D/B/A HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS OLD TOWN,) A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, DEMURRER HEARING PLAINTIFFS,) CASE NO. 37-2020-00015679-CU-IC-CTL VS. SEOUOIA INSURANCE COMPANY, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION; AMTRUST NORTH AMERICA, INC., A) DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND DOES) 1 THROUGH 20, INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANTS. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT SEPTEMBER 25, 2020 **APPEARANCES:** FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: CHARLES S. LIMANDRI, ESQ. LIMANDRI & JONNA, LLP 16236 SAN DIEGUITO ROAD BUILDING 3, SUITE 3-15 RANCHO SANTA FE, CALIFORNIA 92067 858-759-9930 CSLIMANDRI@LIMANDRI.COM FOR THE DEFENDANTS: MS. SARA THORPE MR. TIMOTHY P. KITT NICOLAIDES FINK THORPE, LLP 101 MONTGOMERY STREET SUITE 2300 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104 415-745-3772 STHORPE@NICOLAIDESLLP.COM TKITT@NICOLAIDESLLP.COM MICHELLE R. NEUENSWANDER REPORTED BY: CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER CSR NO. 12508

1	SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 25, 2020, 9:48 A.M.
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3	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
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5	THE COURT: BACK TO NO. 12. ALL RIGHT. THIS IS
6	MY FAVORITE CASE, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT, COUNSEL.
7	THIS IS BEST REST MOTEL VERSUS SEQUOIA INSURANCE.
8	PLAINTIFF, I HAVE
9	MR. LIMANDRI: ATTORNEY CHARLES LIMANDRI,
10	YOUR HONOR.
11	THE COURT: THANK YOU.
12	ON THE PHONE FOR THE DEFENSE, I HAVE?
13	MS. THORPE: SARAH THORPE FOR SEQUOIA.
14	MR. KITT: TIMOTHY KITT FOR SEQUOIA, AS WELL.
15	THE COURT: FOR THE DEFENSE, WHO'S GOING TO ARGUE?
16	MS. THORPE: SARAH THORPE.
17	THE COURT: MS. THORPE, THANK YOU.
18	MS. THORPE, I SHOULD HAVE TOLD YOU THIS
19	BEFOREHAND, IN YOUR ARGUMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO LOOK AT
20	TWO CASES, THE STUDIO I WON'T SAY 54 BUT THE
21	STUDIO 417 CASE
22	THE REPORTER: I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR, I'M HAVING
23	TROUBLE HEARING YOU. YOUR HONOR, I'M HAVING TROUBLE
24	HEARING YOU. THIS IS MICHELLE, THE COURT REPORTER.
25	THE COURT: THAT'S BECAUSE I TURN MY BACK TO SEE
26	PEOPLE. SO I'LL MAKE SURE I SPEAK LOUDER.
27	THE REPORTER: THANK YOU.
28	THE COURT: I WANT BOTH PARTIES TO TALK ABOUT THE

1	STUDIO 417 CASE AND ALSO THE COOPER CASE IN THEIR
2	ARGUMENTS. ALSO
3	MR. LIMANDRI: YES, YOUR HONOR.
4	THE COURT: ONE MORE THING. IT STATES
5	SPECIFICALLY PAGE 4, LINE 21, THE INSURED PROPERTY WAS
6	AND CONTINUES TO BE REPEATEDLY INSPECTED BY INDIVIDUAL
7	COUNTY EMPLOYEES FROM THE PREMISES UNTIL THE VIRUS IS
8	ELIMINATED IN THE REGION.
9	COUNSEL, I'LL WAIT FOR COMMENTS ON THAT, TOO.
10	MS. THORPE: YOUR HONOR, PLEASE TELL ME YOUR
11	REFERENCE AGAIN, WHERE YOU'RE LOOKING?
12	THE COURT: COMPLAINT, PAGE 4. THIS IS THE
13	COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PLAINTIFF, PAGE 4, LINE 21 TO 23.
14	MS. THORPE: OKAY.
15	THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU JUST TAKE YOUR TIME NOW.
16	GOOD NEWS IS WE'VE GOT TIME. AND, MS. THORPE, MAKE YOUR
17	ARGUMENT.
18	MS. THORPE: YES, YOUR HONOR.
19	SO WE ARE AWARE OF YOUR TENTATIVE, YOUR HONOR,
20	WHICH IS THAT THE COMPLAINT ALLEGED ENOUGH TO GET PAST
21	THE DEMURRER. AND SO I DO WANT TO TALK ABOUT WHAT'S IN
22	THE COMPLAINT AND I ALSO WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE POLICY
23	LANGUAGE AND CALIFORNIA LAW. AND WE DON'T NEED TO LOOK
24	TO MISSOURI OR ANY OTHER STATE'S LAW BECAUSE WE HAVE
25	CALIFORNIA LAW ON THIS.
26	SO FIRST OF ALL, IT'S VERY IMPORTANT WHAT'S IN THE
27	COMPLAINT AND YOU JUST POINTED TO A PARTICULAR
28	PROVISION, BUT WHAT THE WHAT THAT SAYS AT LINES 21 TO

24 IS THAT -- IT SAYS, "LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ACROSS THE COUNTRY URGE THEIR CITIZENS TO ACT AS IF THEY WERE INFECTED AND AS IF EVERYONE WAS AROUND THEM WAS INFECTED WITH A NOVEL AND HIGHLY INFECTIOUS VIRUS." SO THAT IS NOT SAYING THAT THERE WAS SUCH A THING AT THE HOTEL.

SO WHAT'S IMPORTANT HERE IS THE COMPLAINT. AND ATTACHED TO THIS COMPLAINT AS EXHIBIT B AND INCORPORATED IN THE COMPLAINT IS THE DENIAL LETTER FOR THIS CLAIM THAT ACTUALLY CAME IN, SO WE KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THE CLAIM. AND THE CLAIM THAT CAME IN TO SEQUOIA, THE INSURED WAS ASKED, "IS THERE ANY PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO YOUR HOTEL?"

AND THE INSURED SAID, "NO." AND THAT IS NOT
REFUTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. BEST REST DOESN'T SAY
ANYTHING ABOUT THAT IN ITS COMPLAINT. THAT IS THE FACTS
IN THE COMPLAINT. THAT LETTER ALSO SAID, "IF YOU HAVE
ANY OTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE TELL US SO WE CAN TAKE
THAT INTO CONSIDERATION WITH YOUR CLAIM." THE
PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE IN THEIR COMPLAINT AT PARAGRAPH 18
THROUGH 24 IS THAT A NUMBER OF ORDERS HAVE CAUSED THEM
TO HAVE TO SHUT DOWN THE HOTELS EITHER TEMPORARILY OR
FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME AND THEY DO -- THAT IS WHAT HAS
CAUSED THE BUSINESS LOSS.

IN ADDRESSING THIS IN THEIR OPPOSITION, THE
PLAINTIFFS VERY CURIOUSLY, UNDER FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS,
ALLEGE AT PAGE 2 OF THEIR OPPOSITION, THAT THE DAMAGE TO
PROPERTY -- BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT THEY NEED TO SHOW
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, THEY SAY IT'S THREE THINGS:

RESTRICTIONS ON TOURISM, AN ABSENCE OF RESERVATIONS, AND LOST BUSINESS INCOME. NONE OF THAT IS PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE INSURED PROPERTY. THAT'S TALKING ABOUT WHAT IS YOUR ECONOMIC LOSS? WHAT HAPPENED? THAT'S THE EFFECT, NOT THE CAUSE.

SO WHAT WE NEED TO DO IS SCOUR THIS COMPLAINT TO

SEE IF THE COURT IS RIGHT THAT THERE'S ENOUGH THERE AND

THERE ISN'T. ALL THERE IS IN PARAGRAPH 25, WHICH IS THE

ONE I THOUGHT YOU WOULD POINT TO, THERE IS A VAGUE

ALLEGATION THAT THERE'S COVID IN OR AROUND THE HOTEL.

THAT'S THE PARAGRAPH THAT PLAINTIFFS EMPHASIZE. AGAIN,

THAT COULD BE LIKE POLLEN DUST. THERE'S SOMETHING IN OR

AROUND THE HOTEL.

THERE'S NO ALLEGATIONS OF PHYSICAL ALTERATIONS OR
A NEED TO REPAIR THIS HOTEL, EITHER ALL OR PART OF IT.
AND IMPORTANTLY, THERE'S BEEN SOME TIME FOR PLAINTIFF TO
REMEDY THIS ABOUT THEIR ALLEGATIONS. THEY GOT THE
CHANCE TO IN RESPONSE TO THE DENIAL THAT WAS SENT TO
THEM IN APRIL 1, THEY HAD THE CHANCE TO WHEN THEY FILED
THIS COMPLAINT IN MAY, THEY HAD THE CHANCE TO IN
RESPONSE TO THIS DEMURRER THAT WAS FILED IN JUNE, AND
PLAINTIFF HAD NOT COME UP WITH ANY PHYSICAL ALTERATION,
PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THEIR INSURED PROPERTY.

NOW, WHY DO I EMPHASIZE THOSE WORDS? THE SEQUOIA POLICY ONLY PROVIDES COVERAGE FOR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, FOR CIVIL AUTHORITY COVERAGE, FOR DEPENDENT PROPERTY COVERAGE IF THERE IS A DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO THE COVERED PROPERTY. AND WE -- THE LANGUAGE IS

CLEAR AND WE KNOW THAT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW, IN
INTERPRETING THE POLICY, YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THE POLICY
LANGUAGE IN YOUR REPLY. THAT'S THE INTENT OF THE PARTY.
YOU CANNOT USE PUBLIC POLICY AS AN INTERPRETIVE AID.
THAT IS WARD AT PAGE 553. THAT'S ONE PLACE WHERE THE
COURTS HAVE SAID THAT.

SO IT IS UNFORTUNATE. I MEAN, WE KNOW THIS IS A DIFFICULT TIME. WE KNOW THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TIME FOR BUSINESSES, BUT THAT DOESN'T CHANGE CONTRACT LANGUAGE. WHAT WE HAVE HERE IS A CONTRACT AND HAS VERY SPECIFIC COVERAGE. THE COVERAGE IS FOR PHYSICAL ALTERATIONS.

THE BEST EXAMPLES ARE IN LOOKING AT ALL THE CASE
LAW, THE CASES THAT THE PARTIES HAVE CITED TO YOU, IT
WOULD BE SO EASY IF THIS WAS A FIRE THAT HAD HARMED A
PROPERTY. THEY WOULD KNOW WAS THE PROPERTY DESTROYED,
WAS IT DAMAGED, DOES IT HAVE TO BE REPAIRED? IT IS
HARDER WHEN IT'S SOMETHING YOU CAN'T SEE. AND THAT'S
WHY THE EXAMPLES OF SMOKE AND SEWAGE AND THINGS LIKE
THAT HAVE BEEN OFFERED. BUT THE CASES THAT FIND
COVERAGE, FIND THAT THERE IS, IN THE WORDS OF THE COURT
FROM MRI HEALTH CARE, A DISTINCT, DEMONSTRABLE PHYSICAL
ALTERATION OF THE PROPERTY. THAT'S MRI HEALTH CARE AT
PAGE 39.

SO UNDER ALL OF THESE COVERAGES THAT IS BUSINESS INCOME COVERAGE, YOU NEED A DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO THE INSURED'S PROPERTY. MRI HEALTH CARE AT PAGE 37 TALKS ABOUT A PHYSICAL DAMAGE THAT NEEDS TO BE

1 REPAIRED. THAT'S WHY EXAMPLES LIKE SMOKE ALL IN A BUILDING THAT GETS INTO THE WALLS AND THE CARPETS AND 2 3 THE SOFT SURFACES, IF YOU HAD TO YOU TAKE THAT ALL OUT AND REPLACE IT ALL, THERE WOULD BE A DEEP CLEAN, YOU CAN 4 5 UNDERSTAND. THERE'S A -- THERE'S A PHYSICAL DAMAGE THAT 6 HAS HAPPENED. 7 BUT LOOK AT MAMA JO'S THAT WE CITE IN OUR REPLY. 8 IF IT'S JUST WIPING DOWN A SURFACE, THAT'S NOT PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IF YOU HAVE TO HEIGHTEN THE AMOUNT OF YOUR 9 10 CLEANING, THAT'S NOT PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY. 11 AND THEY HAVEN'T EVEN SAID THAT. THEY HAVEN'T EVEN 12 ALLEGED THAT, THAT THEY HAD TO SHUT DOWN FOR A WEEK TO 13 CLEAN. I'M SORRY. I CAN SEE YOUR LIPS MOVING, BUT I 14 15 CAN'T HEAR YOU, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT: YOU KNOW, IT'S REALLY YOU SAY, JUDGE, 16 17 DON'T GO THERE, I WON'T GO THERE. ASSUMING THAT A PARTY 18 SAYS, JUDGE, YOU KNOW WHAT WE HAVE TO DO NOW? WE HAVE 19 TO CLEAN THE SURFACES EVERY DAY. EVERY TIME SOMEONE 20 COMES IN, WE'VE GOT TO CLEAN IT. WE'VE GOT TO DO ALL 21 THIS OF WORK TO MAKE SURE THE PLACE IS SANITARY. 22 WOULD THAT BE COVERED? 23 MS. THORPE: IT'S STILL NOT PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IT 24 IS NOT PHYSICAL DAMAGE. THE CLOSEST THING WE FOUND WAS 25 THE MAMA JO'S CASE. 26 THE COURT: OKAY. AGAIN, IF COVID WAS ON A 27 SURFACE AND THEY ARE CLEANING IT DOWN, THEN THAT'S NOT 28 PHYSICAL DAMAGE, CORRECT?

1 MS. THORPE: TO THE INSURED'S PROPERTY. THE COURT: YOU BROKE. STATE THAT AGAIN. YOU 2 3 BROKE. MS. THORPE: OKAY. SORRY. IF YOU LOOK AT 4 5 MAMA JO'S, WHICH IS A FLORIDA CASE, BUT IT RELIED ON 6 CALIFORNIA LAW, MRI HEALTH CARE, THE COURT THERE SAID, 7 IF IT'S JUST WIPING DOWN SOMETHING, IF IT'S JUST 8 CLEANING, YOU HAVE TO CLEAN MORE FREQUENTLY, THAT'S NOT 9 A PHYSICAL ALTERATION TO YOUR PROPERTY. YOUR PROPERTY 10 HAS NOT SUFFERED A PHYSICAL DAMAGE. THAT'S WHAT THOSE 11 WORDS IN THE POLICY MEAN. IT MEANS PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO 12 THE PROPERTY. SO I DON'T THINK THAT THIS CAN ANTICIPATE -- I DON'T THINK THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD ADD 13 14 ANYTHING, AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO MAKE THIS A VIABLE 15 CLAIM. THEY'VE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY, AS I SAID, TO DO 16 THAT. 17 THEY SUGGEST IN THEIR OPPOSITION THAT THEY 18 RECENTLY LEARNED THERE'S AN EMPLOYEE THAT TESTED 19 POSITIVE RECENTLY. WHAT, IN THE LAST MONTH? HARD TO SAY, THEY DON'T SAY AT WORK SPECIFIC. THEY DON'T SAY IF 20 21 IT'S A PERSON WHO CONTRACTED THE VIRUS AT THE HOTEL. 22 THEY DON'T SAY HOW THAT EQUATES WITH PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO 23 THE PROPERTY. SO I THINK WHAT IT SHOWS IS THEY STILL 24 DON'T HAVE PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY; OTHERWISE, 25 THEY WOULD HAVE SAID SO. SO UNDER NONE OF THE COVERAGES CAN THEY STATE A 26 27 VIABLE CLAIM AND, THEREFORE, THE DEMURRER IS APPROPRIATE

RATHER THAN HAVING THE PARTY BRING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY

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1 JUDGMENT. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 2 THE COURT: GOOD ARGUMENT, COUNSEL. 3 ALL RIGHT. PLAINTIFF, WHAT DO YOU SAY IN 4 5 RESPONSE? 6 MR. LIMANDRI: I WILL GO AHEAD, YOUR HONOR, 7 CHARLES LIMANDRI SPEAKING, ADDRESS POINTS THAT I 8 UNDERSTOOD COUNSEL WAS MAKING IN HER REMARKS BECAUSE I 9 WANT TO COVER IT IN A MORE ORGANIZED FASHION ACCORDING 10 TO THE NOTES THAT I WANTED TO USE. BUT SPECIFICALLY, 11 WITH REGARD TO THE POINTS THAT MS. THORPE ENDEAVORED TO 12 MAKE, SHE SAID THE DENIAL LETTER IS SOME TYPE OF 13 ADMISSION. THE DENIAL LETTER IS ATTACHED TO THE 14 COMPLAINT. IT'S GOT SOME SELF-SERVING COMMENT THAT PER 15 OUR CONVERSATION, ON MARCH 20TH THERE WAS NO DIRECT, PHYSICAL DAMAGE TO THE COVERED PROPERTY. 16 17 WELL, I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WAS IN THAT 18 CONVERSATION. OBVIOUSLY, IT'S INCUMBENT UPON THE 19 INSURANCE CARRIER TO INFORM THE INSURED OF THEIR RIGHTS 20 AND BENEFITS AVAILABLE TO THEM UNDER THE POLICY, BUT 21 WHAT I SEE IN THIS LETTER AND WHAT I HEAR FROM 22 MS. THORPE IS THEY ARE JUST CONVENIENTLY FOCUSING ON 23 THOSE WORDS IN THE POLICY THAT THEY THINK BEST SERVE THE 24 INSURANCE COMPANY'S INTEREST, WHICH, OF COURSE, IS NOT 25 THEIR JOB UNDER FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. THE ACTUAL LANGUAGE IS DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE, WHICH WAS 26 27 VERY IMPORTANT TO THE COURT IN THE STUDIO 417 CASE, 28 BECAUSE IT IS IN THE DISJUNCTIVE.

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THAT'S TRUE, THEY MAY BE.

IF MS. THORPE WANTS TO KEEP HAMMERING ON -- ON DAMAGE, THE WAY THAT SEOUOIA MISLEADINGLY DID IN THE DENIAL LETTER, OKAY, BUT LOSS CONNOTES LOSS OF USE. IN THE CASES THAT WE CITED, INCLUDING STUDIO 417, WHICH IS VERY MUCH ON POINT TO OUR FACTS AS WELL AS THE COOPER CASE WHICH WAS A CASE INVOLVING BACTERIA AS WELL AS THE PATEL CASE, WHICH IS A CASE INVOLVING SMOKE. AND QUITE FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, I'M SURPRISED AT THE ADMISSION, AND THAT'S WHAT IT IS, OF MS. THORPE THAT SMOKE IS INDEED A PROPERTY DAMAGE BECAUSE YOU'VE GOT TO CLEAN SURFACES. ISN'T THAT WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT HERE? ISN'T THAT WHAT MY CLIENT HAD TO DO? ISN'T THAT WHAT IS, IN FACT, IN THE PROTOCOLS THAT THEY ASKED THE COURT TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF, THAT A PART OF THE COUNTY ORDERS THAT REQUIRE SANITATION STANDARDS. SO ARE YOU GOING TO HAVE TO CLEAN THE SMOKE ONCE AND THAT'S ENOUGH, BUT IF YOU HAVE TO WIPE DOWN THE COUNTERS AND LARGE SURFACES IN A HOTEL EVERY DAY FOR SIX MONTHS, THAT'S NOT ENOUGH? YOUR HONOR, ISN'T THAT AT LEAST A FACTUAL QUESTION AND ISN'T THAT SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE RAISED AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR TRIAL, FOR A JUDGE OR JURY TO DECIDE AS OPPOSED TO A DEMURRER WHERE ALL FACTUAL INFERENCES HAVE TO BE INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. IT IS TWO PLACES IN THIS COMPLAINT. AND I LIKE THE WAY COUNSEL JUST STOPPED READING WHEN IT'S CONVENIENT. BECAUSE THE PARAGRAPH 18 DOESN'T JUST TALK ABOUT THE COUNTY ORDERS THAT -- THAT THINGS MAY BE INFECTED, WELL,

BUT THEN WE GO ON TO SAY THAT IN THIS CASE IT

CONTINUES TO BE REPEATEDLY INFECTED BY INDIVIDUALS

COMING AND GOING FROM THE PREMISES UNTIL THE VIRUS IS

ELIMINATED IN THE REGION. THIS IS BASICALLY A HOTEL

AIRPORT. IT'S IN OLD TOWN, BUT IT'S A MILE OR SO OF THE

AIRPORT. AND THEY HAVE -- IF I HAD TO -- I SHOULDN'T

HAVE TO, I'VE GOT ADDITIONAL FACTS, BUT THEY HAVE

AIRLINE PERSONNEL CONSTANTLY STAYING THERE EXPOSED TO

EVERYBODY FROM EVERYWHERE.

BUT BEYOND THAT, ON PARAGRAPH 25, WHICH AS

MS. THORPE POINTED OUT, WE QUOTED IN THE COMPLAINT, IT

SAYS, THE VIRUS WAS CARRIED INTO THIS COUNTRY BY

INDIVIDUALS TRAVELING BETWEEN COUNTRIES WHO INFECTED

OTHERS AND THE FACILITIES THEY VISITED, INFECTING

PROPERTY IN AND AROUND THE INSURED PROPERTIES. NOW, I

COULD HAVE GONE ON AND ELABORATED AD NAUSEAM, BUT THE

FACT IS WE SAID THE VIRUS INFECTED THE INSURED PROPERTY

AND PROPERTY AROUND THE INSURED PROPERTY. THAT'S

SUFFICIENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF SHOWING THAT THERE IS

DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF

THE CASES THAT WE CITED WHERE LOSS WOULD INCLUDE

SOMETHING MORE AKIN TO A LOSS OF USE.

AND AGAIN, THAT'S NOT JUST STUDIO 417, PATEL, IT'S
THE COOPER CASE, WHICH INVOLVED BACTERIA, FOR PETE'S
SAKE. I DON'T KNOW HOW ONE CAN MAKE A DISTINCTION
BETWEEN A VIRUS AND BACTERIA, WHICH ARE BOTH
MICROORGANISMS, PARTICULARLY WHEN -- AND I THINK THIS IS
AN OVERRIDING POINT, YOUR HONOR, THERE'S NO VIRUS

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EXCLUSION IN THIS POLICY, WHICH THERE IS IN SOME

80 PERCENT OF THESE BUSINESS INCOME LOSS POLICIES, WOULD

HAVE BEEN VERY EASY FOR SEQUOIA TO PUT THEM IN THE

POLICY AFTER THE SARS EPIDEMIC IN 2005. THE CARRIERS

ALL STARTED TO DO THAT IN 2006. THIS CARRIER CHOSE NOT

TO DO THAT. SO AT THE VERY LEAST, IT'S CREATED AN

AMBIGUITY, WHICH, OF COURSE, UNDER BASIC INSURANCE LAW

HAS TO BE INTERPRETED IN FAVOR OF THE INSURED. AND

EVERY INFERENCE, AGAIN, WHEN THERE ARE TWO REASONABLE

WAYS TO INTERPRET THE POLICY IS THAT IT HAS TO GO IN

FAVOR OF THE INSURED.

THERE IS NO DEFINITION OF DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE IN THIS POLICY. MS. THORPE KEEPS TALKING ABOUT, OH, YOU HAVE TO SHOW STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. REALLY? WHERE DOES IT SAY THAT IN THE POLICY? THE CLOSEST IT COMES IS IN THE PART OF THE POLICY DEALING WITH LIABILITY COVERAGE WHERE THE ONLY DEFINITION GIVEN FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDES LOSS OF USE. THEY'RE GOING TO SAY, OH, WELL, THAT'S A THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY. INTERPRET THE POLICY AS A WHOLE. YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT IT THE WAY THE REASONABLE INSURED WOULD DO IT, SOMEONE WHO IS NOT NECESSARILY TRAINED AS A JUDGE OR LAWYER WHO DOES THIS AS A LIVING. THE REASONABLE INSURED WHO PURCHASED THIS POLICY THAT THIS IS GOING TO INCLUDE BUSINESS INCOME LOSS, AND THEN THEY BASICALLY HAVE EITHER COMPLETELY SHUT DOWN OR IN THIS CASE, AGAIN, MUCH MORE LIBERAL AND BROAD LANGUAGE THAT SAYS SUSPENSION, WHICH IT DOES DEFINE TO INCLUDE A SLOW DOWN. A LOT OF

1 POLICIES SAY YOU HAVE TO HAVE A COMPLETE SHUT DOWN.
2 THIS POLICY DOESN'T.

NOT ONLY THAT, THIS POLICY HAS VERY BROAD LANGUAGE
BOTH FOR THE CIVIL ACTION COVERAGE AND FOR THE DEFENDANT
PROPERTY COVERAGE. FOR THE CIVIL ACTION COVERAGE,
UNLIKE CASES CITED BY SEQUOIA, IT DOESN'T SAY THAT THE
SHUTDOWN ORDER HAS TO BE DIRECTED TO THIS SPECIFIC
INSURED. IT DOESN'T SAY THAT ACCESS HAS TO BE
COMPLETELY BLOCKED. STUDIO 417 ADDRESSES THAT. IT SAYS
YOU COULD ACCEPT ANY ACCESS OR ALL ACCESS, BUT YOU JUST
SAID ACCESS. SO THERE WAS A PARTIAL LOSS OF BUSINESS IN
STUDIO 417 AS THERE OBVIOUSLY WAS TO OUR CLIENT AS IS
PLED IN THE COMPLAINT. AND AGAIN, ON DEMURRER, ALL OF
THIS IS TAKEN AS TRUE. THEY WANT TO CHALLENGE IT ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FACTUALLY, GO FOR IT. OKAY. WE'LL -WE'LL BE HAPPY TO DO THAT. BUT ON DEMURRER, EVERYTHING
IN THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS TRUE.

AS FAR AS DEPENDENT PROPERTY GOES, THEY COULD HAVE SAID WE'RE ONLY GOING TO ALLOW YOU TO COVER IF CERTAIN OF YOUR LEADER PROPERTIES ARE INFECTED BY COVID-19 OR --OR OTHERWISE DAMAGED IN SOME WAY. AGAIN, THEY WOULDN'T HAVE IDENTIFIED COVID-19, BUT THEY COULD HAVE IDENTIFIED THE LEADER PROPERTIES. THEY DON'T DO THAT. OTHER POLICIES DO. THEY DON'T EVEN HAD HAVE A MILEAGE LIMITATION FOR THE DAMAGE TO OTHER PROPERTIES FOR THE DEPENDENT PROPERTY COVERAGE OR THE CIVIL ACTION COVERAGE. IT'S A VERY BROAD COVERAGE.

NOW, WE SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE,

BUT, YOUR HONOR, IT'S COMMON KNOWLEDGE AS WELL THAT

COVID-19 WAS PRESENT IN SAN DIEGO, RIGHT, ALL THE MAJOR

TOURIST ATTRACTIONS CLOSED DOWN, SEA WORLD, THE ZOO,

MOST OF OLD TOWN. SO ALL OF THESE AREAS WHERE OUR

CLIENT WOULD DRAW BUSINESS FROM, THEY COULDN'T DRAW

BUSINESS FROM THERE. SO THEY HAD A SLOWDOWN OR

SHUTDOWN.

IF THEY WANT TO HAVE A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THEY
CAN SHOW THAT SOMEONE AT SEA WORLD OR THE ZOO, YOU KNOW,
HAD COVID-19, THAT'S FINE. I ALREADY INDICATED THAT
SOMEONE AT THE HOTEL DID, WHICH WE LEARNED AFTER WE
FILED THE COMPLAINT. BUT WE HAVE SUFFICIENT FACTS PLED
ALREADY WITHOUT HAVING TO BE SPECIFIC. THEY CAN TEST
THAT IN DISCOVERY AT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IF THEY FEEL THAT
THAT'S PERTINENT.

FOR THE PURPOSES OF TODAY'S HEARING, I BELIEVE
YOUR HONOR GOT IT EXACTLY RIGHT ON THE TENTATIVE RULING.
THE COMPLAINT HAS SUFFICIENT FACTS AND THE CASES THAT
THEY CITE ALL HAVE UNIQUE POLICY PROVISIONS, UNIQUE
FACTS, AND UNIQUE APPLICATIONS OF LAW FROM OTHER
JURISDICTIONS, MOST OF WHICH ARE NOT NEARLY AS LIBERAL
IN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW AS IT APPLIES TO
FINDING COVERAGE TO SUIT THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF
THE INSURED AS EXISTS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW.

SO I CAN GO ON, YOUR HONOR, I HAD AN OUTLINE OF OTHER SPECIFIC POINTS THAT I HAD WANTED TO ADDRESS. I SHOULD MENTION SINCE COUNSEL CITED THE MRI CASE. IT'S WHOLLY DISTINGUISHABLE. THERE THE INSURED SHUT DOWN

THEIR OWN MACHINE, THERE WAS NO EXTERNAL FORCE THAT CAME
TO BEAR AS WE HAVE WITH THE VIRUS PANDEMIC THAT
BASICALLY AFFECTED THE ENTIRE WORLD AND CERTAINLY MY
CLIENT'S HOTEL. AND IT WASN'T EVEN A
LOSS-OF-BUSINESS-INCOME CLAIM ON THE MRI CASE THAT IS
CITED; WHEREAS, THE CASES THAT WE CITE THAT INVOLVE A
LOSS OF USE, BUT THEY FOUND THAT THAT WOULD ALSO FIT THE
DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE REQUIREMENT, HOWEVER ONE
WANTS TO CHARACTERIZE IT AS A LOSS OF USE OR DAMAGE. WE
CITED THE THEE SOMBRERO, I HAVE TO FIND IT, THE SOMBRERO
CASE AS WELL AS THE PATEL CASE AS WELL AS THE ARMSTRONG
CASE WHERE THEY SAID JUST HAVING ASBESTOS IN THE
BUILDING THAT WASN'T RELEASED COULD BE SUFFICIENT TO
TRIGGER COVERAGE.

SOME OF THESE ARE THIRD-PARTY POLICIES THAT TALK

SOME OF THESE ARE THIRD-PARTY POLICIES THAT TALK
ABOUT PHYSICAL LOSS, BUT THEY'RE TALKING ABOUT IT IN THE
SAME WAY AS IT APPEARS IN THE FIRST-PARTY CONTEXT IN
THIS CASE. IN THE PATEL CASE INVOLVING SMOKE THAT BOTH
PARTIES CITED WAS A FIRST-PARTY CASE WHERE THERE WAS
COVERAGE FOR THE CLEANING OF THE SMOKE. SO BETWEEN THAT
AND THE THEE SOMBRERO WHICH SAID YOU CAN CAP YOUR OWN TO
CREATE A STENCH, WHICH WOULD MAKE A PLACE UNINHABITABLE,
WOULD CREATE COVERAGE FOR LOSS OF USE OR DAMAGE. THOSE
ARE ALL CALIFORNIA LAW CASES, YOUR HONOR.

BUT THIS CASE IS BOTH [INAUDIBLE] IN ITS FACTS DUE
TO 417 WHERE THE JUDGE WENT THROUGH THIS ANALYSIS AND
SAID THERE WERE SUFFICIENT FACTS PLED FOR THE PLEADING
STAGE AS THERE ARE IN THIS CASE PARTICULARLY UNDER

PARAGRAPH 18 AND 25, WHICH I READ TO THE COURT AT THE OUTSET OF MY ARGUMENT. I BELIEVE I HAVE NOW ADDRESSED THE PRINCIPLE POINTS THAT I WANTED TO THAT WERE ADDRESSED BY MS. THORPE.

THERE'S OTHER POINTS I CAN MAKE ABOUT WHY, YOU KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, EXTRA EXPENSE COVERAGE, YOUR HONOR -- EXTRA EXPENSE COVERAGE SPECIFICALLY WOULD DEAL WITH THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT SANITATION PROCEDURES AND WE DO INDICATE IN THE COMPLAINT ON PAGES 4, LINES 21 THROUGH 23 THAT THE COVID-19, WHICH EVERYBODY KNOWS BY NOW, I THINK, CAN AND DOES ATTACH TO SURFACES. AGAIN, DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS AND WE HAVE THE SHUTDOWN ORDERS, WHICH THE DEFENSE ATTACHED TO THEIR PAPERS OR THE COURT SHOWED JUDICIAL NOTICE OF, WHICH TALKS ABOUT THE NEED FOR SANITATION STANDARDS.

SO, AGAIN, WITH ALL OF THOSE FACTS PLED AND
OTHERWISE INFORMATION AVAILABLE THROUGH THE REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT THIS COURT HAS GRANTED, I BELIEVE
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE
DEMUR AT THIS JUNCTURE.

THE ONLY OTHER THING I THINK I WANTED TO

MENTION -- I MAY HAVE DONE IT -- YEAH, I THINK I DID

THAT SUSPENSION IN THIS CASE ONLY REQUIRED A SLOWDOWN,

NOT SHUTDOWN. AND ON THE ISSUE THAT THE CALIFORNIA

COURTS WILL LOOK AT THE DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OR DAMAGE

AS SUSTAINED IS DIFFERENT AND NOT THE SAME THE WAY

SEQUOIA WANTS TO APPLY THEM, WE CITED A CALIFORNIA CASE

IN ADDITION TO THE STUDIO 417 CASE, WHICH WAS COOPER

1 VERSUS TRAVELERS INDEM. CO. OF ILLINOIS WHICH ALSO MAKES 2 THAT POINT. 3 SO WITH THAT, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE I'VE COVERED THE MAIN POINTS THAT I FELT WOULD BE NECESSARY AT THIS 4 5 JUNCTURE. OF COURSE, I'M HAPPY TO ADDRESS ANY OTHER 6 POINTS THAT THE COURT MAY FEEL ARE IMPORTANT AT THIS 7 PARTICULAR TIME. THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR HONOR. 8 MS. THORPE: YOUR HONOR, COULD I MAKE THREE 9 POINTS? 10 THE COURT: OF COURSE. 11 MS. THORPE: OKAY. SO FIRST OF ALL, SEQUOIA IS 12 NOT CHERRY PICKING LANGUAGE OUT OF THE POLICY, BUT 13 RATHER GOING RIGHT TO THE INSURING AGREEMENT. AND WE 14 DON'T GET OUT OF THE INSURING AGREEMENT AND DON'T HAVE 15 TO TALK ABOUT EXCLUSIONS BECAUSE THE CLAIM DOESN'T SIT WITHIN THE INSURING AGREEMENT. SO THE INSURING 16 17 AGREEMENT DOES SAY THAT THE INSURED HAS TO SHOW THERE 18 WAS DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO COVERED 19 PROPERTY. I FOCUSSED ON PHYSICAL DAMAGE. 20 COUNSEL SUGGEST LOSS OF USE IS A COVERAGE HERE, 21 BUT NOTICE THE POLICY SAID DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF 22 PROPERTY. AND THE BEST EXAMPLE I WAS ABLE TO FIND IN 23 THE CALIFORNIA CASE LAW, BECAUSE IT JUST MAKES SO MUCH 24 SENSE, IS IN THE WARD CASE. IT TALKS ABOUT USE AND IT 25 TALKS ABOUT HOW THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF LOSS OF PROPERTY. THE INSURED HAD A BUILDING AND LAND AROUND THE 26 27 BUILDING AND THE -- WHAT HAPPENED WAS THE LAND SUBSIDED,

IT GOT WASHED AWAY, AND SO THEY COULDN'T USE THE

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BUILDING AND THEY SOUGHT COVERAGE UNDER THEIR POLICY FOR DAMAGE TO THE BUILDING. SO THE -- THEY LOST THE BUILDING. THEY LOST -- BECAUSE THEY LOST THE LAND, THEY COULDN'T -- THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE BUILDING, EVEN THOUGH THE BUILDING ITSELF WAS NOT PHYSICALLY DAMAGED. BUT THERE WAS PHYSICAL DAMAGE. IT WAS TO THE LAND RIGHT BESIDE IT. SO THAT'S A GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHAT IS MEANT BY LOSS OF PROPERTY.

THIRD, STUDIO 417. NOW, WHY SHOULDN'T WE LOOK AT MISSOURI LAW? IT'S BECAUSE WE HAVE CALIFORNIA LAW, WE DON'T NEED TO LOOK OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA. AND IF YOU WOULD LOOK AT THAT LARGE COMPENDIUM OF CASES WE PROVIDED, IT SHOWS THAT ALMOST EVERY CASE -- THIS IS UNFORTUNATELY A BIG ISSUE. RIGHT? BUSINESSES ARE SHUT DOWN, BUSINESSES ARE HAVING PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF ORDERS FROM COURT -- FROM GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, AND IT'S BECAUSE OF THOSE GOVERNMENT ORDERS, NOT BECAUSE OF PHYSICAL DAMAGE THAT THEY SUSTAIN, THAT MANY BUSINESSES ARE HAVING A HARD TIME. AND SO THEY HAVE, OF COURSE, LOOKED TO INSURANCE AND THEIR INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE DENIED THE CLAIMS AND THAT'S CREATED LAWSUITS AND WE HAVE HAD MANY, MANY MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DEMURRERS AROUND THE COUNTRY.

AND YOU WILL SEE THAT THOSE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND DEMURRERS ARE BEING GRANTED EXCEPT FOR MISSOURI. AND WHY IS THAT? MISSOURI JUST HAS DIFFERENT LAWS THAN CALIFORNIA ON WHAT THAT TERM, "DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO INSURED PROPERTY" MEANS. AND MISSOURI IS NOT APPLYING THE MRI HEALTH CARE'S DEFINITION. NOT

1 APPLYING DISTINCT, DEMONSTRABLE, PHYSICAL ALTERATION OF 2 THE PROPERTY. IT'S JUST DIFFERENT. 3 SO MISSOURI COURTS CAN DECIDE HOW THEY WANT TO INTERPRET THE CASE LAW, BUT CALIFORNIA HAS ALREADY 4 INTERPRETED THIS POLICY LANGUAGE AND HAS SAID THAT 5 6 DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO COVERED PROPERTY 7 REQUIRES A DISTINCT, DEMONSTRABLE, PHYSICAL ALTERATION 8 OF THE PROPERTY AND, THEREFORE, YOU DON'T NEED TO LOOK 9 TO STUDIO 417 OR ANY OTHER CASE FROM MISSOURI TO DECIDE 10 HOW CALIFORNIA COURTS ARE GOING TO DECIDE THIS QUESTION. THOSE ARE MY LAST POINTS, YOUR HONOR. 11 WE WOULD 12 ASK THAT YOU TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE ALLEGATIONS AND I

THINK YOU'LL CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH ALLEGED HERE TO PASS THE DEMURRER STAGE.

THE COURT: I WANT TO THANK YOU BOTH, COUNSEL. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE ARGUMENT. YOU BOTH PRESENT VERY GOOD ARGUMENTS. OBVIOUSLY, FOR THIS COURT, THIS IS A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION AND I WANT TO MAKE SURE I'M COMFORTABLE WITH MY RULING. I AM GOING TO TAKE THIS UNDER SUBMISSION AND LOOK AT IT OVER THE WEEKEND, BUT YOU'LL HAVE A RULING TUESDAY FROM THIS COURT. RULING TUESDAY. BOTH COUNSEL.

MR. LIMANDRI: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR, FOR ALLOWING US THE TIME. I APPRECIATE IT.

MS. THORPE: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: WAIT A SECOND. COUNSEL, IT WILL BE DONE BY FRIDAY. I'VE GOT A TRIAL ON TUESDAY. SORRY.

28 MS. THORPE: OKAY.

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1	MR. LIMANDRI: OKAY.
2	MS. THORPE: WE UNDERSTAND.
3	MR. LIMANDRI: OKAY. WE'LL LOOK FORWARD TO IT.
4	THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
5	MS. THORPE: THANK YOU.
6	MR. LIMANDRI: APPRECIATE IT. HAVE A GREAT
7	WEEKEND.
8	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 10:19 A.M.)
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1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
2	:SS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO)
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4	I, MICHELLE NEUENSWANDER, OFFICIAL REPORTER FOR
5	THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND
6	FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:
7	THAT AS SUCH REPORTER, I REPORTED IN MACHINE
8	SHORTHAND THE PROCEEDINGS HELD IN THE FOREGOING CASE;
9	THAT MY NOTES WERE TRANSCRIBED INTO TYPEWRITING
10	UNDER MY DIRECTION AND THE PROCEEDINGS HELD ON
11	SEPTEMBER 25, 2020, CONTAINED WITHIN PAGES 1 THROUGH 21,
12	ARE A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION.
13	DATED THIS 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER 2020.
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17	Micheller
18	MICHELLE NEUENSWANDER
19	CSR NO. 12508
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